A computer specialist, known as RP, has raised a serious issue with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). Just before starting a job as a technology specialist at MI6 in London, RP learned they failed the vetting process. They argue that the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) didn’t follow proper procedures during the Developed Vetting (DV) assessment for the role.
In their complaint, RP points to significant delays, noting the vetting interview was pushed back by three months. They had to repeatedly follow up to get the process moving. After waiting six months post-application, RP was denied security clearance. They claim that the vetting officers neglected to reach out to essential referees, including a former police colleague, whom they had designated for support.
Adding to their frustrations, RP, who identifies as part of the LGBT+ community, has reported numerous hacking attempts on their email and social accounts immediately after sharing those details during the vetting process. They traced the hacking activities back to IP addresses potentially linked to foreign entities.
UK Security Vetting (UKSV), the organization responsible for vetting government bodies, has faced criticism for its performance. A report from the National Audit Office (NAO) highlighted that only 7% of Developed Vetting applications were processed in time, citing outdated IT systems and insufficient resources. Officials responded that they’ve implemented improvements, claiming 97% of applications are now completed promptly.
RP, who previously passed vetting for a senior MI6 role in 2009, expressed shock at the denial in 2024. They contend that the SIS and UKSV failed to comply with government guidelines requiring them to consider all gathered information. No referees RP named for support were contacted. This includes high-ranking civil servants and past colleagues from law enforcement, as outlined in their complaint.
The refusal letter from SIS didn’t provide any reasoning for the decision. All RP received was a vague response citing national security as the reason for withholding feedback on the vetting outcome. This raised concerns that national security may have been used improperly as a shield against accountability.
Errors also marked the handling of RP’s application; the denial letter came from an office that had recently changed its name, reflecting a broader issue of carelessness in the vetting process. RP underscored that if officials can’t accurately represent their own agency, they question their ability to handle sensitive candidate information correctly.
RP applied for a technology role at SIS in April 2024. By June, they received an offer that hinged on passing the Developed Vetting process. However, the delays continued, compelling RP to push for updates regularly. When the vetting interview finally occurred in October, RP felt uncomfortable when asked about their identity as an LGBT+ person in relation to potential blackmail, but they answered appropriately.
Just weeks later, RP experienced multiple cyber-attacks on their various social media accounts, tracked back to addresses associated with foreign locations. They raised alarm about the timing of these attacks, linking them to the sensitive information disclosed during the DV interview.
Under these challenging circumstances, RP faces a troubling situation. The vetting process has left a blemish on their record, affecting their professional opportunities. They spoke of financial consequences from selling their home, anticipating the job at MI6.
RP is seeking not only to rectify this blemish but also to clarify whether their personal data was protected during the vetting process. They want confirmation about the security measures in place to safeguard against misuse.
Judicial precedents show that overturning such decisions is possible. In a similar case from 2021, a court ruled that Eric Kind, an expert in surveillance law, was unjustly denied security clearance after MI5 raised unfounded concerns.
RP has had their share of issues with vetting procedures before. When applying to work at GCHQ in early 2021, they encountered delays due to miscommunication about their email contacts, highlighting systemic flaws in the security vetting systems used across agencies.
Now, with their current complaint to the IPT, RP aims to have the DV clearance denial reviewed and seeks compensation for the setbacks caused by the mishandling of their application. They hope for a resolution that validates their experiences and addresses the operational shortcomings they’ve faced during the vetting journey. The government claims it has improved procedures since the NAO’s reports, but RP’s case suggests that challenges persist.